

Reading List
Public Choice
Economics 5533

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This course will focus on the way in which individual preferences are aggregated into public sector output through governments. The goal of the course is to provide the student with a general framework within which public sector resource allocation and decision-making more generally can be evaluated. Specific theories will be placed within this general framework with the intention of making all of the individual models a part of a comprehensive theory of public choice. The reading list divides the broader subject matter into five sections: (1) a brief methodological analysis of economics and public choice, (2) democratic decision-making, (3) the political marketplace, (4) the theory of constitutions, and (5) public finance from a public choice perspective. There is more on this reading list than most students would read for a one-semester course, so I will provide more specific guidance to the readings in class.

I. Economic Methodology and Public Choice

1. Williamson, Oliver E., "A Comparison of Alternative Approaches to Economic Methodology," *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics* 146, No. 1 (March 1990), pp. 61-71.
2. Buchanan, James M., "Public Finance and Public Choice," *National Tax Journal* 28 (December 1975), pp. 383-394.
3. Kohn, Meir, "Value and Exchange," *Cato Journal* 24, no. 3 (Fall 2004), pp. 303-339.
4. Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson, "Institutions as the Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth," in Philippe Aghion and Steve Durlauf, eds., *Handbook of Economic Growth*, available at <http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/chad/handbook9sj.pdf>
5. Coase, R.H., "The Institutional Structure of Production," *American Economic Review* 82, No. 4 (September 1992), pp. 713-719.
6. Holcombe, Randall G., *Economic Models and Methodology*. New York, Greenwood, 1989.
7. Hayek, Friedrich A., "The Use of Knowledge in Society," *American Economic Review* 35 (September 1945), pp. 519-530. (Reprinted in *Individualism and Economic Order*.)
8. Holcombe, Randall G., "Make Economics Policy-Relevant: Depose the Omniscient Benevolent Dictator." *The Independent Review* 17, no. 2 (Fall 2012), pp. 165-176.

II. Resource Allocation By Democracy

A. The Median Voter Model

1. Holcombe, Randall G., "The Median Voter in Public Choice Theory," *Public Choice* 61, No. 2 (May 1989), pp. 115-125.
2. Bowen, Howard R. "The Interpretation of Voting in the Allocation of Economic Resources," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 58 (Nov. 1943), pp. 27-48.
3. Black, Duncan, *The Theory of Committees and Elections*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958.
4. Downs, Anthony, *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper & Row, 1957.
5. Romer, Thomas, and Howard Rosenthal, "Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas, and the Status Quo," *Public Choice* 33, No. 4 (1978), pp. 27-43.
6. Holcombe, Randall G., "An Empirical Test of the Median Voter Model," *Economic Inquiry* 18, No. 2 (April 1980), pp. 260-274.

7. McEachern, William A., "Collective Decision Rules and Local Debt Choice: A Test of the Median Voter Hypothesis," *National Tax Journal* 31, No. 2 (June 1978), pp. 129-136.
8. Fernandez, Raquel, and Dani Roderik, "Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty," *American Economic Review* 81, No. 5 (December 1991), pp. 1146-1155.
9. Turnbull, Geoffrey K., and Salpie Djoundourian, "The Median Voter Hypothesis: Evidence from General Purpose Local Governments," *Public Choice* 81, Nos. 3-4 (December 1994), pp. 223-240.
10. Turnbull, Geoffrey K., and Peter M. Mitias, "Which Median Voter?" *Southern Economic Journal* 62, No. 1 (July 1995), pp. 183-191.
11. Gerber, Elisabeth R., and Jeffrey B. Lewis, "Beyond the Median: Voter Preferences, District Heterogeneity, and Political Representation," *Journal of Political Economy* 112, no. 6 (December 2004), pp. 1364-1383.
12. Benoit Le Maux, "Governmental Behavior in Representative Democracy: A Synthesis of the Theoretical Literature," *Public Choice* 141, nos.3/4 (December 2009), pp. 447-465.

B. Public Goods and Efficiency

1. Holcombe, Randall G., *Public Finance and the Political Process*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1983, ch. 2.
2. Samuelson, Paul A., "The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure," *Review of Economics and Statistics* 36 (Nov. 1954), pp. 387-389.
3. Samuelson, P.A., "A Diagrammatic Exposition of a Theory of Public Expenditure," *Review of Economics and Statistics* 37 (Nov. 1955), pp. 350-356.
4. Lindahl, Erik, "Just Taxation -- A Positive Solution," in Richard A. Musgrave and Alan T. Peacock, eds., *Classics in the Theory of Public Finance*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967, pp. 168-176.
5. Wicksell, Knut, "A New Principle of Just Taxation," in Musgrave and Peacock, *Classics*, pp. 72-118.
6. Tiebout, Charles M., "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," *Journal of Political Economy* 64 (Oct. 1956), pp. 416-424.
7. Minasian, Jora R., "Television Pricing and the Theory of Public Goods," *Journal of Law & Economics* 7 (October 1964), pp. 71-80.
8. Varian, Hal R., "A Solution to the Problems of Externalities When Agents are Well-Informed," *American Economic Review* 84, No. 5 (December 1994), pp. 1278-1293.
9. Holcombe, Randall G., "Why Does Government Produce National Defense?" *Public Choice* 137, nos. 1-2 (October 2008), pp. 11-19.

C. Instrumental Versus Expressive Voting

1. Tullock, Gordon, "The Charity of the Uncharitable," *Economic Inquiry* 9 (December 1971), pp. 379-392.
2. Stigler, George J., "Economic Competition and Political Competition," *Public Choice* 13 (Fall 1972), pp. 91-106.
3. Brennan, Geoffrey, and Loran Lomasky, *Democracy and Decision: The Pure Theory of Electoral Preference*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
4. Fischer, A.J., "A Further Experimental Study of Expressive Voting," *Public Choice* 88, Nos. 1-2 (July 1996), pp. 171-184.
5. Caplan, Bryan, "Rational Irrationality and the Microfoundations of Political Failure," *Public Choice* 107 (2001), pp. 311-331.
6. Caplan, Bryan, "The Logic of Collective Belief," *Rationality and Society* 15, no. 2 (2003), pp. 218-242.
7. Caplan, Bryan, *The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007.
8. Ashworth, John, Benny Geys, and Bruno Heyndels, "Everybody Likes a Winner: An Empirical Test of the Effect of Electoral Closeness on Turnout in a Context of Expressive Voting," *Public Choice* 128, nos. 3-4 (September 2006), pp. 383-405.

D. Alternative Voting Systems

1. Holcombe, Randall G., "The Florida System: A Bowen Equilibrium Referendum Process," *National Tax Journal* 30, No 1 (March 1977), pp. 77-84.
2. Tideman, T. Nicolaus, and Gordon Tullock, "A New and Superior Process for Making Social Choices," *Journal of Political Economy* 84 (Dec. 1976), pp.1145-1160.
3. Clarke, Edward H., "Multipart Pricing of Public Goods," *Public Choice* 12 (Fall 1971), pp. 17-33.
4. Clarke, E.H., *Demand Revelation and the Provision of Public Goods*. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1980.
5. Saari, Donald G., "Susceptibility to Manipulation," *Public Choice* 64, No. 1 (January 1990), pp. 21-41.
6. Brams, Steven J., and Jack H. Nagel, "Approval Voting in Practice," *Public Choice* 71, Nos. 1-2 (August 1991), pp. 1-17.
7. Levin, Jonathan, and Barry Nalebuff, "An Introduction to Vote-Counting Schemes," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 9, No. 1 (Winter 1995), pp. 3-26.
8. Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tebellini, "Constitutional Rules and Fiscal Policy Outcomes," *American Economic Review* 94, no. 1 (March 2004), pp. 25-45.
9. Blankart, Charles B., and Dennis C. Mueller, "The Advantages of Pure Forms of Parliamentary Democracy Over Mixed Forms," *Public Choice* 121, nos. 3-4 (October 2004), pp. 431-453.
10. Nicolaus Tideman, *Collective Decisions and Voting: The Potential for Public Choice*. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2006.
11. Randall G. Holcombe and Lawrence W. Kenny, "Evidence on Voter Preferences from Unrestricted Choice Referendums," *Public Choice* 131, nos. 1/2 (April 2007), pp. 197-215

E. Multidimensional Political Competition

1. Arrow, Kenneth J., *Social Choice and Individual Values*, 2nd ed. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963.
2. McKelvey, R.D., "Intransitivities in Multi Dimensional Voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control," *Journal of Economic Theory* 12, No. 3 (June 1976), pp. 472-482.
3. Hinich, Melvin J., "Equilibrium in Spatial Voting: The Median Voter Result is an Artifact," *Journal of Economic Theory* 16, No. 2 (December 1977), pp. 208-219.
4. Holcombe, R., and S.B. Caudill, "Tax Shares and Government Spending in a Median Voter Model," *Public Choice* 46, No. 2 (1985), pp. 197-205.
5. Holcombe, Randall G., "The Size and Significance of the Pareto Set in Spatial Voting Models," *Public Choice* 116, nos. 1-2 (July 2003), pp. 19-29.

F. Stability in Political Decision-Making

1. Tullock, Gordon, "Why so much Stability," *Public Choice* 37, No. 2 (1982), pp. 189-202.
2. Weingast, Barry R., Kenneth A. Shepsle, and Christopher Johnsen, "The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics," *Journal of Political Economy* 89, No. 4 (August 1981), pp. 642-664.
3. Holcombe, *An Economic Analysis of Democracy*, chs. 4, 7, 9.
4. Holcombe, Randall G., and Russell S. Sobel, "The Stability of International Coalitions in United Nations Voting from 1946 to 1973," *Public Choice* 86, Nos 1-2 (January 1996), pp. 17-34.
5. Stratmann, Thomas, "Instability of Collective Decisions? Testing for Cyclical Majorities," *Public Choice* 88, Nos. 1-2 (July 1996), pp. 15-28.
6. Groseclose, Tim, and James M. Snyder, Jr., "Buying Supermajorities," *American Political Science Review* 90, no. 2 (June 1996), pp. 303-315.
7. Carrubba, Clifford J., and Craig Volden, "Coalitional Politics and Logrolling in Legislative Institutions," *American Journal of Political Science* 44, no. 1 (January 2000), pp. 261-277.
8. Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow, *The Logic of Political Survival*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003.

III. The Political Marketplace

A. Special Interests and Discretion

1. Parker, Glenn R., "Looking Beyond Reelection: Revising Assumptions About Factors Motivating Congressional Behavior," *Public Choice* 63, No. 3 (1989), pp. 237-252.
2. Beard, Charles A., *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States*. New York: MacMillan, 1913.
3. McGuire, Robert A., and Robert L. Ohsfeldt, "Self-Interest, Agency Theory, and Political Voting Behavior: The Ratification of the United States Constitution," *American Economic Review* 79, No. 1 (March 1989), pp. 219-234.
4. Jac C. Heckelman and Kieth L. Dougherty, "A Spatial Analysis of Delegate Voting at the Constitutional Convention," *Journal of Economic History* 73, no. 2 (June 2013), pp. 407-444.

B. Ideology

1. Kau, James B., and Paul H. Rubin, "Self-Interest, Ideology, and Logrolling in Congressional Voting," *Journal of Law & Economics* 22, No. 2 (October 1979), pp. 365-384.
2. Kalt, Joseph P., and Mark A. Zupan, "Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics," *American Economic Review* 74, No. 3 (June 1984), pp. 279-300.
3. Peltzman, Sam, "Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting," *Journal of Law & Economics* 27, No. 2 (April 1984), pp. 181-210.
4. Glazer, Amihai, and Bernard Grofman, "Why Representatives are Ideologists though Voters are Not," *Public Choice* 61, No. 1 (April 1989), pp. 29-39.
5. Dugan, William R., and Michael C. Munger, "The Rationality of Ideology," *Journal of Law & Economics* 32, No. 1 (April 1989), pp. 119-142.
6. Gallarotti, Giulio M., "Legitimacy as a Capital Asset of the State," *Public Choice* 63, No. 1 (October 1989), pp. 43-61.
7. Stratmann, Thomas, "The Effects of Logrolling on Congressional Voting," *American Economic Review* 82, No. 5 (December 1992), pp. 1162-1176.

C. Political Markets

1. Crain, W. Mark, "On the Structure and Stability of Political Markets," *Journal of Political Economy* 85, No. 4 (August 1977), pp. 829-842.
2. Kau, James B., Donald Keenan, and Paul H. Rubin, "A General Equilibrium Model of Congressional Voting," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 97 (May 1982), pp. 271-293.
3. Crain, W. Mark, Donald R. Leavens, and Robert D. Tollison, "Final Voting in Legislatures," *American Economic Review* 76, No. 4 (September 1986), pp. 833-841.
4. Koford, Kenneth J., "Centralized Vote Trading," *Public Choice* 39, No. 2 (1982), pp. 245-268.
5. Holcombe, Randall G., and Glenn R. Parker, "Committees in Legislatures: A Property Rights Perspective," *Public Choice* 70 (1991), pp. 11-20.
6. Anderson, Gary M., and Robert D. Tollison, "Congressional Influence and Patterns of New Deal Spending, 1933-1939," *Journal of Law & Economics* 34, No. 1 (April 1991), pp. 161-175.
7. Peltzman, Sam, "Voters as Fiscal Conservatives," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 107, No. 2 (May 1992), pp. 327-361.
8. Coate, Stephen, and Stephen Morris, "On the Form of Transfers to Special Interests," *Journal of Political Economy* 103, No. 6 (December 1995), pp. 1210-1235.
9. Levmore, Saul, "Voting Paradoxes and Interest Groups," *Journal of Legal Studies* 28, no. 2 (June 1999), pp. 259-281.
10. Keith Krehbiel, "Legislative Organization," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 18, no. 1 (Winter 2004), pp. 113-128.
11. Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow, *The Logic of Political Survival*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003.

D. Bureaucracy

1. Niskanen, William A., "The Peculiar Economics of Bureaucracy," *American Economic Review* 58 (May 1968), pp. 293-305.
2. Niskanen, W.A., *Bureaucracy and Representative Government*. Chicago and New York: Aldine-Atherton, 1971.
3. Niskanen, W.A., "Bureaucrats and Politicians," *Journal of Law & Economics* 18 (Dec. 1975), pp. 617-643.
4. Alchian, Armen A., "Some Economics of Property Rights," *Il Politico* 30, No. 4 (1965), pp. 816-829.
5. Holcombe, R. and Edward Price, "Optimality and the Institutional Structure of Bureaucracy," *Public Choice* 33, No. 1 (1978), pp. 55-59.

E. Rent Seeking

1. Tullock, Gordon, "The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft," *Western Economic Journal* 5 (June 1967), pp. 224-232.
2. Kreuger, Anne O., "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," *American Economic Review* 64 (June 1974), pp. 291-303.
3. Posner, Richard A., "The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation," *Journal of Political Economy* 83 (Aug. 1975), pp. 807-827.
4. Tullock, G., "The Transitional Gains Trap," *Bell Journal of Economics* 6 (Autumn 1975), pp. 671-678.
5. McChesney, Fred S., "Rent Seeking and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation," *Journal of Legal Studies* 16, No. 1 (January 1987), pp. 101-118.
6. McChesney, Fred S., *Money for Nothing: Politicians, Rent Extraction, and Political Extortion*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997.
7. Anderson, Terry L., and Peter J. Hill, "Privatizing the Commons: An Improvement?" *Southern Economic Journal* 50, No. 2 (October 1983), pp. 438-450.

F. The Efficiency of Political Institutions

1. Becker, Gary, "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 98 (August 1983), pp. 371-400.
2. Denzau, Arthur T., and Michael C. Munger, "Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized Interests Get Represented," *American Political Science Review* 80, no. 1 (March 1986), pp. 89-106.
3. Wittman, Donald, "Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results," *Journal of Political Economy* 97, No. 6 (December 1989), pp. 1395-1424.
4. Wittman, Donald A., *The Myth of Democratic Failure: Why Political Institutions are Efficient*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995.
5. Olson, Mancur, Jr., "Dollar Bills Left on the Sidewalk: Why Some Nations are Rich, and Others Poor," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 10, No. 2 (Spring 1996), pp. 3-24.

IV. Constitutional Decision-Making

A. The Social Contract Theory of the State

1. Gordon, Scott, "The New Contractarians," *Journal of Political Economy* 84, No. 3 (June 1976), pp. 573-590.
2. Rawls, John, *A Theory of Justice*. Cambridge: Belknap, 1971.
3. Buchanan, J.M., *The Limits of Liberty*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975.
4. Yeager, Leland B., "Rights, Contract, and Utility in Policy Espousal," *Cato Journal* 5, No. 1 (Summer 1985), pp. 259-294.
5. Holcombe, Randall G., *An Economic Analysis of Democracy*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1985, chs. 2, 10.

6. Skaperdas, Stergios, "Cooperation, Conflict, and Power in the Absence of Property Rights," *American Economic Review* 82, No. 4 (September 1992), pp. 720-739.
7. Holcombe, Randall G., *The Economic Foundations of Government* (New York: New York University Press, 1994), chs. 2, 3, and 4.
8. Hirshleifer, Jack, "Anarchy and Its Breakdown," *Journal of Political Economy* 103, No. 1 (February 1995), pp. 26-52.
9. McGuire, Martin C., and Mancur Olson, Jr., "The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule," *Journal of Economic Literature* 34, No. 1 (March 1996), pp. 72-96.

B. The Theory of Constitutions

1. Buchanan, James M., "The Domain of Constitutional Economics," *Constitutional Political Economy* 1, No. 1 (Winter 1990), pp. 1-18.
2. Buchanan, James M., "An Economic Theory of Clubs," *Economica* (Feb. 1965), pp. 1-14.
3. Buchanan, J.M., and Gordon Tullock, *The Calculus of Consent*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962. Ch. 6.
4. Lee, Dongwon, Thomas E. Borcherding, and Youngho Kang, "Public Spending and the Paradox of Supermajority Rule," *Southern Economic Journal* 80, no. 3 (January 2014), pp. 614-632.
5. Usher, Dan, "The Dynastic Cycle and the Stationary State," *American Economic Review* 79, No. 5 (December 1989), pp. 1031-1044.
6. Usher, Dan, *The Welfare Economics of Markets, Voting, and Predation*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992.
7. Holcombe, Randall G., "Constitutions as Constraints: A Case Study of Three American Constitutions," *Constitutional Political Economy* 2, No. 3 (Fall 1991), pp. 303-328.
8. Holcombe, Randall G., "The Distributive Model of Government: Evidence from the Confederate Constitution," *Southern Economic Journal* 58, No. 3 (January 1992), pp. 762-769.
9. Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini, "Constitutions and Economic Policy," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 18, no. 1 (Winter 2004), pp. 75-98.
10. Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini, *The Economic Effects of Constitutions: What Do the Data Say?* Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003.
11. Mueller, Dennis C., "Constitutional Political Economy in the European Union," *Public Choice* 124, nos. 1-2 (July 2005), pp. 57-73.
12. Congleton, Roger D. *Perfecting Parliament: Liberalism, and the Rise of Western Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

C. Conflict and Cooperation

1. Buchanan, James M., "The Relevance of Pareto Optimality," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (Nov. 1962), pp. 341-354.
2. Axelrod, Robert, *The Evolution of Cooperation*. New York: Basic Books, 1984.
3. Coase, Ronald H., "The Problem of Social Cost," *Journal of Law & Economics* 3 (October 1960), pp. 1-44.
4. Buchanan, James M., "Politics, Policy, and the Pigouvian Margins," *Economica* n.s. 29 (Feb. 1962), pp. 17-28.

D. Equity

1. Konow, James, "Which is the Fairest of All? A Positive Analysis of Justice Theories," *Journal of Economic Literature* 41, no. 4 (December 2003), pp. 1188-1239.
2. Baumol, William J., "Applied Fairness Theory and Rationing Policy," *American Economic Review* 72, No. 4 (Sept. 1982), pp. 639-651.
3. Holcombe, Randall G., "Applied Fairness Theory: Comment," *American Economic Review* 73 No. 5 (Dec. 1983), pp. 1153-1156.
4. Holcombe, Randall G., "Absence of Envy Does Not Imply Fairness," *Southern Economic Journal* 63, no. 3 (January 1997), pp. 797-802.
5. Hochman, Harold, and James Rogers, "Pareto Optimal Redistribution," *American Economic Review* 59, No. 4 (Sept. 1969), pp. 542-557.

6. Stigler, George J., "Director's Law of Public Income Distribution," *Journal of Law & Economics* 13, No. 1 (April 1970), pp. 1-10.
7. Browning, Edgar K., "Inequality and Poverty," *Southern Economic Journal* 55, No. 4 (April 1989), pp. 819-830.
8. Bruce, Neil, and Michael Waldman, "Transfers in Kind: Why They Can Be Efficient and Nonpaternalistic," *American Economic Review* 81, No. 5 (December 1991), pp. 1345-1351.
9. Browning, Edgar K., "The Marginal Cost of Redistribution," *Public Finance Quarterly* 21, No. 1 (January 1993), pp. 3-32.

V. Economics from a Public Choice Perspective

A. Taxation

1. Holcombe, Randall G., "Tax Policy from a Public Choice Perspective," *National Tax Journal* 51, no. 2 (June 1998), pp. 359-371.
2. Winer, Stanley L. and Walter Hettich, "What is Missed if We Leave Out Collective Choice in the Analysis of Taxation?" *National Tax Journal* 51, no. 2 (June 1998), pp. 373-389.
3. Holcombe, Randall G., "The Ramsey Rule Reconsidered," *Public Finance Review* 30, no. 6 (November 2002), pp. 562-578.
4. Lohmann, Susanne, and Deborah M. Weiss, "Hidden Taxes and Representative Government: The Political Economy of the Ramsey Rule," *Public Finance Review* 30, no. 6 (November 2002), pp. 579-611.
5. Stroup, Michael D., "An Index for Measuring Tax Progressivity," *Economics Letters* 86 (2005), pp. 205-213.

B. Regulation

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2. Posner, Richard A., "Theories of Economic Regulation," *Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science* 5 (Autumn 1974), pp. 335-358.
3. Posner, Richard A., "Taxation by Regulation," *Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science* 2 (Spring 1971), pp. 22-50.
4. Peltzman, Sam, "Toward a More General Theory of Regulation," *Journal of Law & Economics* 19 (August 1976), pp. 211-240.
5. Benson, Bruce L., M.L. Greenhut, and Randall G. Holcombe, "Interest Groups and the Antitrust Paradox," *Cato Journal* 6, No. 3 (Winter 1987), pp. 801-817.

C. Government Growth

1. Robert Higgs, *Crisis and Leviathan: Critical Episodes in the Growth of American Government*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987.
2. Terry L. Anderson and P.J. Hill, *The Birth of a Transfer Society*. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1980.
3. Pelzman, Sam, "The Growth of Government," *Journal of Law & Economics* 23, No. 2 (October 1980), pp. 209-287.
4. Peacock, Alan T., and Jack Wiseman, *The Growth of Public Expenditures in the United Kingdom*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961.
5. Dudley, Leonard, "Punishment, Reward and the Fortunes of States," *Public Choice* 74, No. 3 (October 1992), pp. 293-315.
6. Holcombe, Randall G., "Are There Ratchets in the Growth of Federal Government Spending?" *Public Finance Quarterly* 21, No. 1 (January 1993), pp. 33-47.
7. Holcombe, Randall G., "The Growth of the Federal Government in the 1920s," *Cato Journal* 16, no. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 175-199.

8. Holcombe, Randall G., "Veterans Interests and the Transition to Government Growth: 1870-1915," *Public Choice* 99, nos. 3-4 (June 1999), pp. 311-326.
9. Holcombe, Randall G., *From Liberty to Democracy: The Transformation of American Government*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002.
10. Becker, Gary S., and Casey B. Mulligan, "Deadweight Costs and the Size of Government," *Journal of Law & Economics* 46, no. 2 (October 2003), pp. 293-340.
11. Holcombe, Randall G., "Government Growth in the Twenty-First Century," *Public Choice* 124, nos. 1-2 (July 2005), pp. 95-114.

D. Fiscal Policy

1. William Nordhaus, "The Political Business Cycle," *Review of Economic Studies* 42, no. 2 (April 1975), pp. 169-190.
2. Kenneth Rogoff, "Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles," *American Economic Review* 80, no. 1 (March 1990), pp. 21-36.
3. Georgios Efthymiou, "Political Budget Cycles in the European Union and the Impact of Political Pressures," *Public Choice* 153, nos. 3/4 (December 2013), pp. 295-327.

E. Economic Growth and Prosperity

1. Gwartney, James, Robert Lawson, and Randall Holcombe, "Economic Freedom and the Environment for Economic Growth," *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics* 155, no. 4 (December 1999), pp. 643-663.
2. Baumol, William J. "Entrepreneurship: Productive, Unproductive, and Destructive." *Journal of Political Economy* 98, no. 5, Part 1 (October 1990), pp. 893-921.
3. Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. "Economic Backwardness in Political Perspective." *American Political Science Review* 100, no. 1 (February 2006), pp. 115-131.
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5. North, Douglass C., John Joseph Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast. *Violence and Social Orders*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
6. Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson, "Economics versus Politics: Pitfalls of Policy Advice," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 27, no. 2 (Spring 2012), pp. 173-192.
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